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It seems that once in the history of thought, common law
rules of evidence were not conceived to involve a system of general
principles. When, in the fullness of time, the idea of a general
evidentiary construct developed, however, hardly were any two
writers able to agree upon the appropriate divisions and arrange-
ments of the general system. Sometimes writers could not agree
upon the statement of a particular principle. Professors Thayer
and Wigmore, among others, put an end to that situation. At the
same time, the chief practical difficulty today, as always, lies in
the particular application of a mass of evidentiary rules, in deter-
mining the bearing of various principles upon a given evidentiary
issue of fact here and now. Nowhere has this situation continued
truer than with reference to rules about evidentiary spoliation.,
"Indeed, after reading all there is on the subject in a recent volu-
minous text-book, one may well be bewildered, owing to the
collection of crude, inadvertent and contradictory material."' As
a result, the "request to charge which more frequently than any
other is made in improper form is that dealing with the failure to
call a witness." 3
* Professor of Law, University of Puget Sound School of Law; B.A. Wesleyen Univer-
sity, 1952; J.D. University of Chicago Law School, 1958.
1. Secondary material on this subject includes: 3 J. BENrJ4d, RATmONALE OF JuDicLL
EVIDENCE 165-69 (1827); 1 C. MooRE, A TREATw ON FACTS §§ 562-99 (1908); S. PHIPSON,
EVIDENCE §§ 360-65 (10th ed. 1963); W. RIcHnmnsoN, EVIDENCE §§ 91-92 (10th ed. 1973); 2
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 286 (3d ed. 1940) (hereinafter cited as WIoMORE); Lawson, The
Effect of Withholding, Suppressing and Manufacturing Evidence in Civil Cases, 18 AM.
L. REV. 185 (1884); Maguire & Vincent, Admission Implied from Spoliation or Related
Conduct, 45 YALE L.J. 226 (1935); Comment, Drawing an Inference From the Failure to
Produce a Knowledgeable Witness: Evidentiary and Constitutional Considerations, 61
CALIF. L. REV. 1422 (1973); 30 CALIF. L. REV. 79 (1941); 34 CoRNELL L.Q. 637 (1949); 17
OKLA. L. REv. 74 (1964).
2. Reehil v. Fraas, 129 App. Div. 563, 567, 114 N.Y.S. 17, 20 (1908), rev'd on other
grounds, 197 N.Y. 64, 90 N.E. 340 (1909).
3. Shientag, The Trial Of A Civil Jury Action In New York, 69 UNITED STATES L. REV.
183, 211 (1935). See also Shientag, Some Observations Concerning The Trial Of A Jury
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A litigant frequently has a choice among several ways to
prove a contested proposition of fact. Simple common sense
prompts a litigant to produce the most persuasive evidence possi-
ble. Clearly, it is good policy to put the litigant under pressure
to produce the best, the most reliable, and the most enlightening
evidence available. This is a proposition at least as old as the case
of the chimney-sweep's boy' and is no doubt as ancient as rules
of evidence. As Lord Chief Justice Mansfield observed,5 it is a
"maxim that all evidence is to be weighed according to the proof
which it was in the power of one side to have produced and in the
power of the other to have contradicted." It is a rule of common
sense and on occasion even finds expression in legislation.'
The nature of the pressure upon litigants to produce the best
evidence varies. In one area the so-called "best evidence rule"
affirmatively requires production of the most cogent proof of the
contents of a centrally significant writing. This rule may be
stated thus: to prove the terms of a writing, the original writing
itself is regarded as the primary evidence, and secondary evidence
is inadmissable unless failure to introduce the original is satisfac-
torily explained.' This is generally, however, the only instance in
Action, 74 N.Y.L. REv. 23, 28 (1940). But see Clifton v. United States, 45 U.S. (4 How.)
242, 248 (1846) (Nelson, J.) ("practical illustrations . . . of the rule are witnessed daily
• . . and are too familiar to every lawyer to require a more particular reference").
4. Armory v. Delamirie, 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (1722). A chimney sweeper's boy found a
jewel, which he took to defendant, a jeweler, for appraisal. The jeweler refused to return
it. In the boy's action of trover, upon the issue of value, the Chief Justice directed the
jury that "unless the defendant did produce the jewel and show it not to be of the finest
water, they should presume the strongest against him, and make the value of the best
jewels the measure of their damages; which they accordingly did." Id. Similarly, in Mor-
row v. United States, 408 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. 1969), Judge Heaney remarked: "the defen-
dant introduced no evidence to show that the guns were not loaded and, therefore, the
jury could properly infer that they were loaded." Id. at 1391.
5. Blatch v. Archer, 98 Eng. Rep. 969 (1774). See also Kirby v. Tallmadge, 160 U.S.
379, 383 (1896).
6. E.g., WASH. REv. CODE § 60.24.200 (1976) ("Damages for eloigning ... or removing
marks").
7. This writer prefers to state the "best evidence rule" as follows: If a transaction is
embodied in a writing so that by substantive law or the practice of the parties the transac-
tion is written and reference must be made to the writing to ascertain the terms of the
transaction, proof of the terms of the transaction is of necessity proof of the writing. In
such cases, unless unavailable (without fault of the proponent) or collateral, the original
of the writing must be produced. See, e.g., State v. Polet, 144 Wash. 629, 639, 258 P. 501,
505 (1927). Subjective intention is equally effective in bringing the rule into play. See,
e.g., Sylvania Elec. Products, Inc. v. Flanagan, 352 F.2d 1005, 1007-08 (1st Cir. 1965).
Flanagan, however, contains this overbroad assertion: "It is well settled that the best
evidence that is obtainable in the circumstances of the case must be adduced to prove
any disputed fact[!]" Id. at 1007. See generally C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 559-78 (2nd
ed. 1972); J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 484, 489
(1898). See also 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *368, quoted in THAYER, id. at 491.
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which the pressure is in the nature of an exclusionary rule.' The
pressure takes the form of criminal penalty in some instances.'
In other situations the pressure is only persuasive. A plaintiff
seeking to prove the making of an advance of money to a defen-
dant may rely on his own testimony; the testimony of a disinter-
ested onlooker or eavesdropper; proof of an admission by a defen-
dant; proof of a regular business entry; or any combination
thereof, together with other evidence. Similarly, in a murder case,
the prosecutor may rely on eye-witness testimony; a dying decla-
ration of the alleged victim; a confession; circumstantial evi-
dence; or some combination of these or different proofs. The pres-
sure in these cases to make the proponent's side strong and clear
lies in the risk that a natural suspicion-sharpened by the ad-
verse comment of astute opposing counsel-may arise from fail-
ure to adduce the most cogent proof the trier believes, or is led
to believe, should be available if the proponent's contentions as
to the facts are sound.
Already in 1846, Mr. Justice Nelson discussed the "pressure
rules" as follows:
One of the general rules of evidence, of universal applica-
tion, is, that the best evidence of disputed facts must be pro-
duced of which the nature of the case will admit. This rule,
speaking technically, applies only to the distinction between
primary and secondary [written] evidence; but the reason as-
signed for the application of the rule in a technical sense is
equally applicable, and is frequently applied, to the distinction
between the higher and the inferior degree of proof, speaking in
a more general and enlarged sense of the terms, when tendered
as evidence of a fact. The meaning of the rule is, not that courts
require the strongest possible assurance of the matters in ques-
tion; but that no evidence shall be admitted, which, from the
nature of the case, supposes still greater evidence behind in the
party's possession or power; because the absence of the primary
evidence raises a presumption, that, if produced, it would give
a complexion to the case at least unfavorable, if not directly
adverse, to the interest of the party ...
8. Some jurisdictions qualify the statement in the text. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Misti-
cos, 207 Miss. 361, 376, 42 So. 2d 397, 402 (1949) ("[N]o such inference upon inference
will be permitted to prevail when the fact sought to be established by such inference upon
inference is capable of more satisfactory proof by direct, or positive or demonstrative,
[sic] evidence, within the reasonable power of the party holding the burden to pro-
duce.").
9. Secreting a witness is an obstruction of justice offensive to the federal criminal
code, 18 U.S.C. § 1503. See, e.g., Parsons v. United States, 386 F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1967).
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For a like reason, even in cases where the higher and inferior
testimony cannot be resolved into primary and secondary evi-
dence, technically, so as to compel the production of the higher;
and the inferior is therefore admissible and competent without
first accounting for the other, the same presumption exists in
full force and effect against the party withholding the better
evidence; especially when it appears, or has been shown, to be
in his possession or power, and must and should, in all cases,
exercise no inconsiderable influence in assigning to the inferior
proof the degree of credit to which it is rightfully entitled."0
Notwithstanding the pressures on a party to come forward
with the best evidence available, it is an unavoidable, albeit la-
mentable, fact that ofttimes a party, for various reasons, will fail
to do so. It remains, therefore, to consider the effect of this recal-
citrance upon the spoliator's case. "[A]ctions are often, if not
always, stronger talismans of intentions and beliefs than
words."" Evidence proving or tending to establish that a party to
an action, or his agent, has attempted to bribe a witness to give
false testimony in favor of the party,12 or has otherwise attempte d
to fabricate or suppress evidence, 3 or in fact has been merely
10. Clifton v. United States, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 242, 247-48 (1846). When it is apparent
that more direct and explicit proof was within the power of the party to produce, "the
same caution which rejects the secondary evidence will awaken distrust and suspicion of
the weaker and less satisfactory; and . . . it may well be presumed [that a] more perfect
exposition . . .would have laid open deficiencies and objections which the more obscure
and uncertain testimony was intended to conceal." Id. at 248. Cases also using the term
"presumption" include, e.g., Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. 118, 121 (1893); Keifer v.
State, 204 Ind. 454, 462, 184 N.E. 557, 560 (1933) ("raises only a presumption of fact");
Lee v. State, 156 Ind. 541, 60 N.E. 299 (1901) (presumption of fact); Doty v. State, 7
Blackf. 427 (Ind. 1845). The matter is succinctly put in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United
States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939): "The production of weak evidence when strong is available
can lead only to the conclusion that the strong would have been adverse." Id. at 226. See
also Runkle v. Burnham, 153 U.S. 216, 225-26 (1894) (White, J.).
11. Lamin v. McTighe, 72 Wash. 2d 587, 593, 434 P.2d 565, 569 (1967). See Pratt v.
Bishop, 257 N.C. 486, 126 S.E.2d 597 (1962). It is perhaps too obvious to merit citation
that the "actions" must appear of record. See, e.g., Long v. United States, 422 F.2d 1024,
1026 (9th Cir. 1970); Group v. United States, 408 F.2d 344, 346 (1st Cir. 1969); Hall v.
United States, 419 F.2d 582, 585 (5th Cir. 1969); Wynn v. United States, 397 F.2d 621,
625 (D.C. Cir. 1967); People v. Hannon, 19 Cal. 3d 588, 564 P.2d 1203, 138 Cal. Rptr. 885
(1977).
12. State v. Rolfe, 92 Idaho 467, 444 P.2d 428 (1968) is a stunning example of witness
bribery. In Rolfe, a rape defendant offered the witness money to testify that he had taken
the prosecutrix home on the night of the alleged crime. See also Williams v. Dutton, 400
F.2d 797, 805 (5th Cir. 1968); State v. Russell, 62 Wash. 2d 635, 636-37, 384 P.2d 334, 335
(1963). In State v. Maloney, 101 Ariz. 111, 115, 416 P.2d 544, 548 (1966), however, the
defendant was not allowed to elicit that a prosecution witness's parents' expenses had
been paid to come from out of state to the trial.
13. E.g., Ashcroft v. Tennessee, 327 U.S. 274 (1946); Cummings v. United States, 398
F.2d 377, 380 (8th Cir. 1968); State v. Arnold, 130 Wash. 370, 374, 227 P. 505, 506 (1924)
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insufficiently assiduous in offering evidence when under the cir-
cumstances he would be expected to do so, is usable by the oppo-
nent. Although collateral to the issues traversed, evidence of ac-
tion to fabricate or suppress is competent as an admission by
conduct that the spoliating party has, or thinks he has, a weak
case and that his evidence is defective or insufficient. 4 Such facts
are similar to the conduct of a prisoner seeking to escape before
trial, 5 or of a merchant to destroy or alter his books of account."
Such proof is directly relevant, moreover, in a line of inference
running about as follows: litigant has bribed a witness; litigant
believes his case is bad; litigant has reason to consider it bad, and
he should know; hence his cause is bad.
(threats by accused against witness). But see Lowe v. Donnelly, 36 Colo. 292, 85 P. 318
(1906); Walker v. Herke, 20 Wash. 2d 239, 248-51, 147 P.2d 255, 259-61 (1944).
14. Moriarty v. London, Chatham & Dover Ry., 5 Q.B. 314 (1870). Mrs. Moriarty
sued for injuries she sustained in alighting from defendant's train; her husband sued for
loss of her services. At trial one Whymark testified that Mr. Moriarty and one Cox, his
attorney's clerk, suborned perjury in regard to the cause of the accident: "Cox said, 'We
can make a nice case about it, we have got a good medical man, and if you and I and
Dawle keep it together we shall be able to make a nice little bit between the trio.'" Two
other witnesses deposed to similar overtures. Chief Justice Cockburn stated: "I think it
was rightly admitted. The conduct of a party . . . may be of the highest importance in
determining whether [his] cause . . . is honest and just . . . . I think that the evidence
was admissible, inasmuch as it went to shew that the plaintiff thought he had a bad case."
The line of inference as to the husband: (1) plaintiff suborned perjury; (2) therefore he
thought his cause was bad; (3) therefore the defendant was not negligent. The line of
inference as to the wife (who did not suborn perjury): (1) her husband suborned perjury;
(2) therefore he thought the cause was bad; (3) his opinion was based on what she told
him; (4) therefore defendant was not negligent. See also Newark Union v. Newark Morn-
ing Ledger Co., 397 F.2d 594, 599 (3d Cir. 1968); State v. Sharbono, 563 P.2d 61, 70 (Mont.
1977); Langley v. Devlin, 95 Wash. 171, 163 P. 395 (1917); WIGMORE § 278; Annot., 79
A.L.R.3d 1156 (1977). It has been said, however, that even bribing a witness "cannot take
the place of proof of necessary facts." Login v. Waisman, 82 N.H. 500, 502, 136 A. 134,
136 (1927).
15. E.g., State v. Owen, 94 Ariz. 404, 385 P.2d 700 (1963); Mills v. People, 146 Colo.
457, 362 P.2d 152 (1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 841 (1962) (flight from scene of crime);
Banks v. State, 257 Ind. 530, 276 N.E.2d 155 (1971); Turner v. State, 255 Ind. 427, 265
N.E.2d 11 (1970); Thomas v. State, 254 Ind. 561, 261 N.E.2d 224 (1970); Pierce v. State,
253 Ind. 650, 256 N.E.2d 557 (1970); Commonwealth v. Geagan, 339 Mass. 487, 159 N.E.2d
870, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 895 (1959); People v. Yazum, 18 App. Div. 2d 409, 239 N.Y.S.2d
686 (1963); State v. Thomas, 63 Wash. 2d 59, 385 P.2d 532 (1963); Note, 34 ROcKY MTN.
L. REv. (1962). Cf. Bird v. United States, 187 U.S. 118 (1902) (strength of inference
resulting from escape attempt depends on attendant circumstances). See also Mills v.
People, 146 Colo. 457, 362 P.2d 152 (1961), cert. denied, 369U.S. 841 (1962); State v. Parr,
64 Wash. 2d 921, 395 P.2d 196 (1964) (that defendant threw away two guns not shown to
be the robbery weapons, admissible as admission of guilt). As to attempts by accused to
commit suicide, see 1964 WASH. U.L.Q. 204; 7 N.C. L. Rsv. 290 (1928). See generally
Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations On The Law Of Evidence-Consciousness Of
Guilt, 77 U. PA. L. REv. 725 (1929).
16. E.g., Henderson v. Hoke, 21 N.C. 119 (1835).
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Apart from the use of spoliation as directly relevant and
affirmative evidence in a line of inference bearing upon a fact
traversed, spoliation has also the effect of coloring other affirma-
tive proof. It may go further than merely reflecting upon the
contents of spoliated material, do more than merely suggest the
document destroyed would have worked against the destroyer or
the witness retained in the wings would have testified adversely
to the interest of the spoliator. Some spoliation evidence is used
properly and effectively to reflect adversely upon the entire side
of a controversy. 7 Where it appears that a forgery or fraud in
some material parts of the evidence has been the contrivance of
a party to the proceeding, it affords a lever against all of the
evidence on that side of the question, and has the effect of per-
suading the trier of fact to lend greater credence to all of the
evidence of the other party and less to all of the evidence of the
spoliator. Proof of spoliation is not usually conclusive, even when
believed by the jury,"8 because a party may think he has a bad
case when he has in fact a good one, but such proof nevertheless
tends to discredit his witnesses and cast doubt upon his entire
position. Moreover, such proof may well operate with conclusive
effect upon the minds of the jurors or trier of fact, notwithstand-
ing the conduct in most cases is not acknowledgement of a spe-
cific fact, but merely concession of the general weakness of his
claim or defense. The protection against the drawing of unwar-
ranted inferences must lie in the fact that such evidence does not
alone bottom an adverse verdict, in the right to offer explanation,
and in the closing argument of counsel.
The precise categorization of spoliation evidence has been
the subject of debate among legal scholars. Some writers have
regarded spoliation evidence as within the category of admis-
sions, an exception to the rule against hearsay." Other scholars,
however, have considered it more appropriately under the head-
ing of rules about relevancy. 0 Both classifications have much to
be said for them. The rules about spoliation have a very ancient
17. Pope v. Hoopes, 84 F. 927, 929 (C.C.D.N.J. 1898); State v. Sharbono, 563 P.2d
61, 70 (Mont. 1977).
18. It hardly requires mention that the trier is free to ignore the inference. E.g.,
Williams v. United States, 394 F.2d 821, 822 (5th Cir. 1968); Buckner v. State, 252 Ind.
379, 383, 248 N.E.2d 348, 351 (1969).
19. E.g., WIGMORE §§ 277, 1048; D. STANSBuIW, THE NomH CAROLINA LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 178 (2d ed. 1963).
20. E.g., PHIPSON, EVIDENCE § 361 (10th ed. 1963); WIGMORZ § 277; Maguire & Vin-




history under the maxim omnia praesumuntur contra
spoliatorem, and involve inferences or deductions based upon
experience. The treatment of spoliation evidence may involve (1)
its use logically, as a deliberative fact or even as directly proba-
tive; (2) its use in the way of judicial administration, as retribu-
tive of an insult to the court; or (3) its use as declarative or
assertive conduct, in which case it sometimes is considered that
it must satisfy the party admissions exception to the hearsay rule.
Spoliation rules are divisible in another way: they can be
used to regulate the presentation of proofs, argument, and in-
structions to juries. They also are used procedurally to regulate
the conduct of litigants, to chastise the dishonest and unscrupu-
lous. A good example is found in the rules governing assessment
of damages and the practice concerning neglect or refusal to obey
discovery orders. Moreover, a plaintiffs failure to produce a wit-
ness equally available to his opponent may work to plaintiffs
disadvantage, and even to the destruction of his cause, not by
virtue of spoliation as an inference, but because the plaintiff
without the testimony of the omitted witness may be unable to
satisfy the requisite degree of proof. Thus, a bill to reform a deed
on the grounds of mistake was dismissed when the complainant's
and defendant's testimony was irreconcilable and complainant
neglected to call as a witness a disinterested onlooker who was
present and in fact participated in the antecedent negotiations. 2'
The mere failure of a party to call a knowledgeable witness to
testify, however, and the permissible inference to be drawn there-
from, will not convert evidence otherwise insufficient into a prima
facie case. 22 The idea is, we cannot give affirmative or substantive
value to something that is nonexistent.
Judicial response to evidentiary spoliation has been varied;
decisions run all the way from a presumption of fact, 23 so-called,
to the apparent drawing of an inference against a plaintiff who
neglected to call defendant's employee.24 The decisions are con-
21. Pope v. Hoopes, 84 F. 927, 929 (C.C.D.N.J. 1898).
22. Northern Pac. Co. v. Page, 274 U.S. 65, 74 (1927). See, e.g., A.L.B. Theatre Corp.
v. Loew's, Inc., 355 F.2d 495 (7th Cir. 1966); Vanity Fair Paper Mills, Inc. v. F.T.C., 311
F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1962); United States v. Cherkasky Meat Co., 259 F.2d 89 (3d Cir. 1958);
Sunbeam Co. v. Golden Rule Appliance Co., 252 F.2d 467, 471-73 (2d Cir. 1958) (L. Hand.,
J. concurring; Lumbard, J. dissenting) (an extreme example of the rule); United States
v. Roberson, 233 F.2d 517, 519 (5th Cir. 1956); Middletown Trust Co. v. Bregman, 118
Conn. 651, 657, 174 A. 67, 70 (1934); National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Eddings, 188
Tenn. 512, 221 S.W.2d 695 (1949).
23. E.g., Keifer v. State, 204 Ind. 454, 184 N.E. 557 (1933).
24. Burwell v. Crist, 251 F. Supp. 686, 688 n.3 (M.D. Pa. 1966), rev'd on other
grounds, 373 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1967).
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fused and inconsistent. The subject is absurdly complex because
of a failure to recognize we should be dealing with a guide to the
conscience of the trier, not with a legal imperative, perhaps
adopted or even descended from other frames of reference. Juries
should be given a free field, instead of having their thought pro-
cesses constricted by rules of law that are at best difficult accu-
rately to state and even more difficult truly to apply.
The problem of patterning jury instructions relating to the
effect to be given to evidentiary spoliation is similar to the prob-
lem the courts confront when attempting to instruct upon the
degree of proof needed to sustain a claim against an estate upon
an oral contract by a decedent to pay for personal services per-
formed for him. Because decedent's testimony is no longer avail-
able, such claims naturally are scrutinized with care and upheld
only if fully and clearly established. Yet a charge that such claims
are viewed with suspicion, that every detail must be established
by a preponderance of the evidence, and that the contract must
be proved in all particulars by absolutely disinterested witnesses
and established by the clearest and most convincing evidence,
was held error.2 5 The jury may be given cautionary counsel, but
the responsibility of determination rests ultimately with them. A
trial judge should not-and should not be required to-charge as
a rule of law, a caution designed to guide the trier's conscience.
The "median" common law rule on nonproduction of wit-
nesses may be expressed as follows: in case a litigant fails, absent
explanation satisfactory to the trier, to call an available material
witness, when under all the surrounding circumstances a reasona-
ble litigant would do so, an unfavorable, but rebuttable, inference
may be drawn against the litigant, by virtue of which the evi-
dence he actually offers is construed, or colored, against him.
2
This formulation takes into account most, if not all, of the qualifi-
cations of the rule. It supposes that the parties are permitted to
comment upon the nonproduction of evidence by their opponents,
25. McKeon v. Van Slyck, 223 N.Y. 392, 119 N.E. 851 (1918).
26. This formulation is quite similar to that of Mr. Leo Larkin, author of the student
note in 34 CoRNELL L.Q. 637, 642 (1949), and would apply to tangible evidence. See United
States ex rel. C.H. Benton, Inc. v. Roelof Constr. Co., 418 F.2d 1328, 1332 (9th Cir. 1969).
It is well put by Judge Breitel in Seligson, Morris & Newburger v. Fairbanks Whitney Co.,
22 App. Div. 2d 625, 257 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1965): "[T]he jury is entitled, if it wishes, to give
the strongest weight to the evidence already in the case in favor of the other side and which
has not been, but might have been, effectively contradicted or explained by the absent
witnesses." Id. at 630, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 710. Obviously, without some direct evidence
indicating what the absent witness would have said, the court must not permit the jury
to merely speculate about what the absent witness would have said. Felice v. Long Island
R.R., 426 F.2d 192, 195 n.2 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J.).
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when the nonproduction is itself properly before the tribunal,
with certain exceptions in criminal cases. It avoids the fruitless
doctrinal dispute whether there are not always conflicting, albeit
persuasively divergent, inferences available at the behest of all
parties. It recognizes the inapplicability of the rule when the
evidence is equally available to both parties, although it avoids
the doctrinal difficulty posed when the proof in question is privi-
leged. The formulation further takes account of the nonavailabil-
ity of the rule when the proof is merely cumulative, or when a
pertinent witness is incompetent. Ultimately, the rule seems to
boil down to one of common sense, but is well worth consideration
for all of that.
BASIC REQUIREMENTS
When a party fails to call an available witness to testify to
matters within his knowledge that would further elucidate facts
in dispute, it is only natural to infer that the party fears to call
him. The obvious supposition is the witness, if called, would ex-
pose facts unfavorable to the party who otherwise would naturally
be expected to call him. "It is plain that the inference is based,
not on the bare fact that a particular person is not produced as a
witness, but on his nonproduction when it would be natural for
him to produce the witness if the facts known to him would have
been favorable." Accordingly, the question arises, when would
it be natural for a party to produce a witness?
First, it is obvious that the nonproduced evidence must be
within the power of the party to produce. Unless there is some
kind of duty, moral or otherwise, to produce the witness, so that
nonproduction involves some measure of "fault," no adverse in-
ference can be drawn. 21 This is the unanimous rule. 21 No fault is
present, no inference can be sought or drawn, and no instruction
can be given, when the witness is outside the jurisdiction (or
subpoena power) of the court without the complicity of the
27. WIGMORE § 286 at 166. See Mammoth Oil Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 13, 51-
53 (1927); Forsberg v. United States, 351 F.2d 242, 249 (9th Cir. 1965). For stunning
possibilities in paternity cases, see In re Comm'r of Social Serv., 75 Misc. 2d 971, 348
N.Y.S.2d 831 (1973).
28. Thus, in an action by an unemployment compensation claimant against a State
Employment Commission alleging sex discrimination, the Commission's destruction of
records pertaining to claimant could not bottom an inference when the destruction was
pursuant to Commission regulations pertaining to disposal of inactive records. Vick v.
Texas Emp. Comm'n, 514 F.2d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1975). See also United States v. Free-
man, 514 F.2d 1314, 1318 n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
29. United States v. Noah, 475 F.2d 688, 691 (9th Cir. 1973); WIGMORE § 286.
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party,1" when the witness is mentally or physically ill, 31 or indeed
when the party proves to be unaware that the witness possesses
the knowledge the opposing party imputes to him. 2 Thus, it has
been held that a party's unsuccessful attempts to locate a witness
before trial precluded the drawing of an inference:33 "This rule
• . .is applicable only in cases where the party, whose duty it is
to produce the witness, has failed to explain the reason for the
absence of the witness. Here, it is shown, by the testimony of [the
party], that he attempted to locate the [witness] on several
occasions prior to the trial and that his efforts were unsuccess-
ful.' ,34
Probably the most famous example of this sort of explanation
of nonproduction is Case v. New York Central Railroad.35 Case
was a conductor suing under the Federal Employer's Liability Act
for injuries suffered when he allegedly stepped in a hole by defen-
dant's tracks at the Albany station. Case claimed the accident
might have been witnessed by a brakeman named Moore and
probably Was ,b...ved by a fireman on a yard engine. As Judge
Friendly observed, "though [plaintiff] called neither as a wit-
ness, failure by the Central to produce them. . ., if unexplained,
would have given rise to an inference favorable to him, '3 and
unfavorable to the Railroad. The inference could not be drawn,
however, unless it would have been natural for the Railroad to
produce the witnesses if the facts known by them were favorable.
Hence, the Railroad was properly allowed to call its claim agent
to testify that the brakeman was in Florida and would not return
until after the trial, that he had interviewed and taken state-
ments from all three firemen and the three engineers working in
the Albany yard at the time, and that none of the six knew any-
thing about this accident. The trial judge observed, "that finishes
that," and as Judge Friendly remarks, "it did."37 This proof was
offered, so two of the three judges thought, to explain 8 the non-
30. E.g., Smith v. Uniroyal, Inc., 420 F.2d 438, 441-43 (7th Cir. 1970); Chicago, R.I.
& P. Ry. v. King, 210 Ark. 872, 197 S.W.2d 931 (1946).
31. See Gass v. United States, 416 F.2d 767, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
32. McKinstry v. Collins, 74 Vt. 147, 52 A. 438 (1902) (semble) (but want of aware-
ness must be shown); State v. Fitzgerald, 68 Vt. 125, 34 A. 429 (1896).
33. Muhleisen v. Eberhardt, 21 So. 2d 235 (La. Ct. App. 1945).
34. Id. at 237. See also Case v. New York Cent. R.R., 329 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1964).
35. 329 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1964). See also Commercial Ins. Co. of Newark v. Gonzalez,
512 F.2d 1307 (1st Cir. 1975).
36. Case v. New York Cent. R.R., 329 F.2d 936, 937 (2d Cir. 1964).
37. Id. A similar doctrine is applicable even in criminal cases. See, e.g., State v. La
Porte, 58 Wash. 2d 816, 824, 365 P.2d 24, 29 (1961).
38. In Gray v. United States, 394 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1968), the prosecutrix was not
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production as witnesses of the railroad employees, and for this
limited purpose the claim agent's testimony was not hearsay. The
testimony was offered "to show that the Central reasonably be-
lieved that none of the men working in the yard had any knowl-
edge and their nonproduction thus could not properly be attrib-
uted to fear of their testimony. 39 If Case wanted an instruction
thus limiting the claim agent's testimony, "it was for him to seek
it."4o This case perhaps goes too far, yet the principle is clear: if
the failure to produce evidence is satisfactorily explained, the
inference is unavailable.
Similarly no inference is available when it would be fruitless
to call the witness. Thus, comment and instruction are improper
when a criminal defendant fails "to call to the stand a witness
who would have to incriminate himself."'4 '
Second, as a limitation upon the principle, no inference is
available where the witness in question for any reason would
appear to be so prejudiced against the party that he could not
expect to elicit from him the unbiased truth. 42
Third, it is quite plain that putative witnesses whose testi-
mony is insignificant, or cumulative,'43 or inferior to what is ac-
called by the government, the explanation being.that in the "opinion" of a psychiatrist,
"it would be injurious to her health were she to be required to appear." Id. at 101. See
also Wong v. Swier, 267 F.2d 749, 759 (9th Cir. 1959) (explanation for tampering with
ladder; jury question; inference not conclusive); Schumacher v. United States, 216 F.2d
780, 787-88 (8th Cir. 1954). A fascinating example of insufficient explanation is Carr v.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 384 F. Supp. 821, 831 (W.D. Ark. 1974).
39. Case v. New York Cent. R.R., 329 F.2d 936, 938 (2d Cir. 1964).
40. Id. Judge Hays, dissenting, concedes that "of course it is nonsense to require the
production of witnesses to explain why they are not produced." Id. Yet he seems to have
a point. Case relied on the eyewitness testimony. Central was seeking to prove that the
accident did not occur. Under the guise of rebutting a spoliation inference, Central was
permitted to prove precisely that out of the mouth of a person other than the eyewitness.
Such "bootstrapping" has been condemned. E.g., Foster v. Atlanta Rapid Transit Co.,
119 Ga. 675, 677, 46 S.E. 840, 841 (1904); Birmingham v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 361
Mo. 458, 465-66, 235 S.W.2d 322, 327-28 (1950). See also Shasta S.S. Co. v. Great Lakes
Towing Co., 44 F. Supp. 572 (W.D.N.Y. 1942) (Counsel stipulated he "had no objection
• ..to the reasons given. . . for the nonproduction"; equivalent to proof by the nonprod-
ucer).
41. Bradley v. United States, 420 F.2d 181, 186 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
42. E.g., People v. Bridgeforth, 51111. 2d 52, 59, 281 N.E.2d 617, 621 (1972); Carter
v. Troy Lumber Co., 138 Il. 533, 28 N.E. 932 (1891); State v. Cousins, 58 Iowa 250, 12
N.W.2d 281 (1882) (alleged accomplice). Cf. Fierberg v. Whitcomb, 119 Conn. 390, 177
A. 135 (1935) (another dentist in same building).
43. E.g., United States v. Johnson, 467 F.2d 804, 808 (1st Cir. 1972); United States
v. Johnson, 371 F.2d 800, 807 (3d Cir. 1967); State v. Davis, 73 Wash. 2d 271, 438 P.2d
185 (1968); State v. Davis, 12 Wash. App. 288, 291, 529 P.2d 1157, 1159 (1974); State v.
Smyth, 7 Wash. App. 50, 499 P.2d 63 (1972). See also People v. Norwood, 5 Ill. App. 3d
130, 133, 283 N.E.2d 256, 258 (1972).
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tually presented, may be dispensed with by a party without ap-
prehension about the drawing of unfavorable inferences. The
grounds of expense and inconvenience, not only from the stand-
point of the individual party but also from that of society at large,
should serve to justify the rule. Put somewhat more strongly,
there seems to be a general limitation, depending in its applica-
tion upon the particular facts in each case, that the inference is
unavailable-cannot fairly be drawn-except from nonproduc-
tion of witnesses whose testimony would be expected to be supe-
rior with respect to the fact to be proved. 44 Absent such limita-
tion, counsel would have no choice but to call all possible wit-
nesses, a result clearly undesirable from whatever standpoint.
The want of clarity in connection with this third limitation
is pointed up by a federal case involving a night, wartime collision
between a battleship and a merchant marine vessel .45 The United
States called many witnesses, including the captain of the battle-
ship, and members of the watches of the battleship and the ac-
companying destroyer escort. But the owners of the sunken mer-
chant vessel complained that three specifically named crew mem-
bers were not called. The court recognized the general principle
that failure to call witnesses who are available "may" give rise
to the inference their testimony would not be helpful, but ap-
proved a ruling by the district judge: " 'But when there are a
dozen witnesses to an event and two of them are not called to
testify, I know of no authority which compels a court to discredit
entirely the testimony of the other ten.' ",46 Still it would appear
possible the court may discredit to some degree the testimony of
those who did testify; use of the word "entirely" would support
such a claim. The weight to be given the inference, it is clear, is
to be determined by the particular facts of each case.
Several King County, Washington, Superior Court judges
have confirmed their use of such a rule.47 The general consensus
was that a party's failure to call a competent witness when he
otherwise would and should have is grounds for an adverse infer-
ence, and if he produced some other evidence it is possible to
discredit it. The judges also agreed that when a party calls certain
44. WIGMORE § 287 at 168-69. See United States v. Young, 463 F.2d 934, 940 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (witnesses too remote).
45. Pacific-Atlantic S.S. Co. v. United States, 175 F.2d 632 (4th Cir. 1949).
46. Id. at 636 (emphasis added). Cf. People v. Smith, 3 Ill. App. 3d 64, 278 N.E.2d
551 (1971) (one of nineteen witnesses called).
47. Interviews by Mr. James Gavin, a member of the Washington Bar, taken while a




witnesses but fails to call others who have some particular knowl-
edge of the case, use of a negative inference, with some appropri-
ate limitations, is universal. The limitations mentioned by the
judges are those described in the cases: e.g., competence of the
witness, noncumulative quality of his testimony to avoid defeat
of efficient, speedy disposition of the case, and so forth. In any
event, counsel always is free to demonstrate a good reason for not
calling the particular witness.
The judges believed the calling of professional forensic medi-
cal experts posed an interesting situation. One judge (it was his
opinion that almost all the others did likewise) remarked that the
calling of a professional plaintiff's doctor, coupled with the failure
of the plaintiff to call the personal physician who actually ren-
dered most of the medical attention, would give rise to an adverse
inference that the attendant physician, had he testified, would
have testified somewhat unfavorably to plaintiff.48 The judges
seemed unconcerned-and justly so-that a physician-patient
privilege exists in the State of Washington. The patient can-and
in such an instance should-waive the privilege.
Fourth, it is commonly-but not universally'-indicated
48. Some physicians seem to be spending the majority of their time in court
as witnesses for one side or the other. Many times [and this was commented
upon with general agreement] an attorney uses two physicians-one who has
thoroughly examined the client and who has attended him for the major portion
of his illness leading to trial and another, the so-called professional wit-
ness/physician who, after a cursory examination of the client, can turn on the
jurors with his wonderful oration. When this happens, and it is not infrequent,
one can but wonder and conjecture just why the attorney did not call the first
physician, after looking at all the evidence, rather than the second.
Judge of the Superior Court of King County, Washington, anonymous. Id.
49. See, e.g., United States v. Cotter, 60 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1932) (L. Hand, J.). "When
both sides fail to call a witness who knows something of the facts, their conduct, like
anything else they do, is a circumstance which a jury may use. If they both call him and
he is impartial, ordinarily it will have little weight . Id. at 692. And Professor
Wigmore observes:
Yet the more logical view is that failure to produce is open to an inference
against both parties, the particular strength of the inference against either de-
pending on the circumstances. To prohibit the inference entirely is to reduce to
an arbitrary rule of uniformity that which really depends on the varying signifi-
cance of facts which cannot be so measured.
WIGMORE § 288 at 171 (emphasis in original). Either party can comment on failure of the
other to call the witness. If both comment, the weight, if any, of each inference, is for the
trier to decide. In each case, the natural question is, if the witness would be more harmful
to your opponent, why did you neglect to call him? See also United States v. Free, 437
F.2d 631, 636 (D.C. Cir. 1970); United States v. Evanchik, 413 F.2d 950 (2d Cir. 1969);
United States v. Dibrizzi, 393 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Comulada, 340
F.2d 449, 452 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 978 (1965); Billeci v. United States, 184 F.2d
394, 398-99 (D.C. Cir. 1950); United States v. Beekman, 155 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1946).
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that no inference is permissible when prospective witnesses are
equally available to each side and particularly when such wit-
nesses actually are present in court.0 For the inference to be
drawn, then, it must be clear there was a discrepancy in the
availability of the witness to the several parties;51 the burden of
proving the availability of the witness should rest with the party
seeking the benefit of the inference, and not upon the party who
fails to call the witness, although the latter will nevertheless for
tactical reasons often make explanation."
Fifth, although the inference can be drawn when the witness
who is not called and the party are one and the same,53 there is a
minority (diminishing at that) view to the contrary. These au-
thorities emphasize "honor"; men of honor and integrity should
not be subjected to the disgrace of having to prove their personal
qualities. An old Georgia case5' states the argument as follows:
We think. . . it is becoming, and to be commended, in a party
not to testify, if he can avoid it without positive injury to the
cau.LO f ta l an JUot4,,e. o as be -1- 1. .1-0A
be no presumption that he is counseled by prudence rather than
by modesty. While his cause should not gain by his forbearance
to testify, neither should it lose by it. Public policy forbids that
a suitor should feel constrained to mount the witness stand for
no purpose but to let the jury know that he has something to
say in his favor, or to show them that he can face the terrors of
a cross-examination without breaking down. The encourage-
ment of anything like competition in swearing would be too sure
to breed perjury. Let those testify in their own behalf who volun-
50. See United States v. Blakemore, 489 F.2d 193, 195 (6th Cir. 1973); United States
v. Fisher, 484 F.2d 868 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Johnson, 467 F.2d 804 (1st Cir.
1972); United States v. Sherwood, 435 F.2d 867, 868 (10th Cir. 1970); United States v.
Chapman, 435 F.2d 1245, 1247 (5th Cir. 1970); Simon v. United States, 424 F.2d 796, 799
(D.C. Cir. 1970); United States v. Spencer, 415 F.2d 1301, 1304 (7th Cir. 1969); Brown v.
United States, 414 F.2d 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Lamb v. United States, 414 F.2d 250, 252
(9th Cir. 1969); United States v. Tant, 412 F.2d 840 (5th Cir. 1969); City of Birmingham
v. Levens, 241 Ala. 47, 200 So. 888 (1941); Fierberg v. Whitcomb, 119 Conn. 390, 177 A.
135 (1935); Loehr v. National Security Life Ins. Co., 144 Ind. App. 503, 247 N.E.2d 232
(1969). See also authorities gathered in WIGMORE § 288 at 189-90.
51. E.g., Jenkins v. Bierschenk, 333 F.2d 421, 425 (8th Cir. 1964); Schoenberg v.
Commissioner, 302 F.2d 416, 420 (8th Cir. 1962). Mere presence in the courtroom does not
constitute equal availability. E.g., McClanahan v. United States, 230 F.2d 919, 926 (5th
Cir. 1956); State v. Davis, 73 Wash. 2d 271, 276-77, 438 P.2d 185, 188 (1968).
52. See, e.g., Case v. New York Cent. R.R., 329 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1964).
53. E.g., Howe v. Howe, 199 Mass. 598, 603, 85 N.E. 945, 947-48 (1908). As a matter
of fact, failure of a knowledgeable party litigant to testify is an admission and substantive
evidence in many, if not most, states. See, e.g., Wilborg v. Dengell, 359 Mass. 279, 268
N.E.2d 855 (1971).
54. Thompson v. Davitte, 59 Ga. 472 (1877).
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tarily present themselves; but let no uncharitable imaginations
light upon those who stay away, merely because they might
swear if they would.5
Would this view hold if the party in question possessed the only
direct evidence in his favor? Would the appropriate inference be
that he would have testified favorably and not unfavorably? Most
jurisdictions now have taken the view that the failure of a party
to take the stand to testify in his own behalf gives rise to the same
inferences as would flow from his failure to call a knowledgeable
witness subject to his control.5 Of course, the same qualifications
apply as in the case of any other witnesses, even in the majority
jurisdictions. Thus, for example, the inference would be available
only when the party was a useful, competent witness. Histori-
cally, parties were incompetent as witnesses." When the incom-
petency was removed, one supposes that the party should be
treated like any other witness so far as spoliation rules are con-
cerned.58
Sixth, it should be noted, however, criminal defendants, as
party witnesses, are not treated like parties in civil cases. It is a
constitutional guarantee that no person shall be compelled in any
55. Id. at 480. These cases should be contrasted with those cases critical, in greater
or lesser degree, of rules allowing admissions by silence as an exception to the hearsay rule
(or as non-hearsay). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kenney, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 235, 237
(1847) (Shaw, C.J.); Moore v. Smith, 14 Serg. & Rawl. 388, 393 (Pa. 1826); Vail v. Strong,
10 Vt. 457, 463 (1838); and especially Mattocks v. Lyman, 16 Vt. 113, 119 (1844). See also
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (use of post-arrest silence offends due process); United
States v. Brierly, 269 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (same); State v. Upton, 16 Wash. App.
195, 556 P.2d 239 (1976) (same). Decisions such as People v. Smith, 25 Ill. 2d 219, 184
N.E.2d 841 (1962), are easy to attack.
56. See, e.g., Hinton & Sons v. Strahan, 266 Ala. 307, 96 So. 2d 426 (1957):
When the . . . facts are peculiarly within a party's knowledge, and he fails
or refuses to testify, when present at the trial, such failure or refusal is always
subject to comment by the opposite party in a civil action; but the fact that
matters in issue are not peculiarly within the party's knowledge is not of itself
a significant ground to bar the adversary from commenting on his failure or
refusal to testify.
Id. at 311-12, 96 So.2d at 430. See also Attorney General v. Pelletier, 240 Mass. 264, 316,
134 N.E. 407, 423 (1922) ("The law simply recognized the natural probative force of
conduct contrary to that of the ordinary man of integrity."); McNeill v. McNeill, 223 N.C.
178, 182, 25 S.E.2d 615, 617 (1943); WIGMORE § 289.
57. Thus, in Charles Dickens' THE PICKWICK PAPERS, Mr. Pickwick did not take the
stand to explain he had never promised to marry Mrs. Bardell. The law said he need not
(indeed he could not). Had he done so, the whole case would have tumbled down like a
house of cards.
58. In this connection, however, a party may "corroborate" testimony of the opposing
party by failing to testify, thus rendering disregard of the testifying party's testimony"arbitrary." Dumes v. Harold Laz Advertising Co., 2 Ariz. App. 387, 388, 409 P.2d. 307,
308 (1965).
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criminal case to give evidence against himself.5 9 The United
States Supreme Court has held the self-incrimination guarantee
of the fifth amendment forbids both federal and state judges to
allow either prosecutorial comment upon an accused's silence or
instructions that such silence will bottom any inference as to
guilt. 0 Indeed, judges today must, upon request, instruct the jury
that no inference of guilt can be drawn from an accused's failure
to testify. 1 Moreover, it is error to refuse to instruct the jury to
disregard the prosecutor's comment upon failure by the accused
to testify.62 And it has been held a state prosecutor's comment
upon the failure of one defendant to testify can sufficiently preju-
dice a codefendant who did testify, to call for a new trial.6 3 In-
deed, reversible error can these days easily be committed by the
court in the method adopted by the judge to rebuke offending
prosecutors.
Generally, adverse inferences are equally applicable in crimi-
nal as in civil cases, where nonparty witnesses are concerned,64 or
defe ndant wUhn have7 waived their nrivilpp 65 nnf.wit.ht.andling
the burden of proof is different. As the Tennessee Supreme Court
has observed:66
59. U.S. CONST. amend. V.; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 9.
60. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Clark v. Nelson, 411 F.2d 790 (9th Cir.
1969). Prosecutorial comment may, however, not justify reversal if it is harmless. The test
enunciated by the court is "that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless,
the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). See also Fontaine v. California, 390 U.S.
593 (1968); Anderson v. Nelson, 390 U.S. 523 (1968); State v. Broadhead, 413 F.2d 1351,
1361 (7th Cir. 1969); People v. Bynum, 556 P.2d 469 (Colo. 1976).
61. State v. Goldstein, 65 Wash. 2d 901, 400 P.2d 368 (1965).
62. State v. Stromberger, 152 Wash. 699, 277 P. 1119 (1929); Spokane v. Roberts, 132
Wash. 568, 232 P. 316 (1925); State v. Hanes, 84 Wash. 601, 147 P. 193 (1915).
63. Scott v. Perini, 439 F.2d 1066 (6th Cir. 1971); Kinser v. Cooper, 413 F.2d 730 (6th
Cir. 1969). Already in 1921, the suggestion by a district attorney that a defendant on trial
for murder should have called an accomplice already convicted of first degree murder in
connection with the same homicide was dismissed by the New York Court of Appeals as
"fantastic." People v. Slover, 232 N.Y. 264, 269, 133 N.E. 633, 635 (1921).
64. United States v. Welp, 446 F.2d 867, 868 (9th Cir. 1971) (defendant's father);
United States v. Cox, 428 F.2d 683, 688 (7th Cir. 1970); State v. Mims, 222 Kan. 335, 337,
564 P.2d 531, 534-35 (1977) (alibi; defendant claimed "he was in the company of a number
of friends and relatives," but only his wife was called; failure to call others properly
commented upon and inferences drawn); State v. Robinson, 219 Kan. 218, 221, 547 P.2d
335, 338 (1976).
65. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 494 (1917); United States v. Pledger,
409 F.2d 1335, 1336 (5th Cir. 1969).
66. Ford v. State, 184 Tenn. 443, 449, 201 S.W.2d 539, 541 (1945). See also State v.
La Porte, 58 Wash. 2d 816, 365 P.2d 24 (1961). As a corollary, where the prosecution makes
out a probable case on an issue of which the accused has peculiar knowledge and could
easily prove, but does not, an inference favorable to the prosecution arises. Wilson v.
United States, 162 U.S. 613 (1896); Moore v. United States, 271 F.2d 564, 568 (4th Cir.
Spoliation
It is, of course, now well settled that our statute . . . pro-
viding that no presumption of guilt of the defendant shall arise
from his failure to testify in his own behalf, has application only
to the personal testimony of the defendant himself and does not
extend to apparently available testimony by others.
The problem is sometimes, however, not that simple. Thus, what
if accused's witness pleads the self-incrimination privilege and
refuses to testify? It has been held: 7
[Tihe correct rule is that, when a witness [other than the
accused] declines to answer a question on the ground that his
answer would tend to incriminate him, that refusal alone cannot
be made the basis of any inference by the jury, either favorable
to the prosecution or favorable to the defendant.
The reason for the rule seems clear: the witness is exercising a
constitutional right personal to himself, the exercise of which
should not affect the rights of the parties to the lawsuit one way
or the other.
One additional rule, peculiar to criminal cases, must be men-
tioned. The prosecutor has a duty to disclose material evidence
favorable to accused."8 Furthermore, prosecutorial destruction or
suppression of evidence in a criminal proceeding may deprive
defendant of due process, thus vitiating the proceeding"9 or re-
quiring a new trial.7 0 Thus, in State v. Wright,"' defendant was
convicted of first degree murder. However, evidence taken from
the victim's person and from the room in which the victim was
1959); State v. Clay, 29 Ohio App. 2d 206, 209-10, 280 N.E.2d 385, 388 (1972).
67. Billeci v. United States, 184 F.2d 394, 398 (D.C. Cir. 1950). See also Annot., 24
A.L.R.2d 895 (1952).
68. Hamric v. Bailey, 386 F.2d 390, 393 (4th Cir. 1967); Barbee v. Warden, 331 F.2d
842, 847 (4th Cir. 1964). See McSurely v. McClellan, 426 F.2d 664, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
United States v. Elmore, 423 F.2d 775, 779 (4th Cir. 1970); United States ex rel. Meers v'
Wilkins, 326 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1964). The prosecutor, however, has no duty to produce if
the defendant is aware of the evidence and does not request it. Wallace v. Hocker, 441
F.2d 219, 220 (9th Cir. 1971). See Brown v. Crouse, 425 F.2d 305, 309 (10th Cir. 1970).
The same result obtains if the evidence was destroyed unbeknownst to the prosecution
by a third party. Margoles v. United States, 402 F.2d 450, 452 (9th Cir. 1968).
69. E.g., State v. Wright, 87 Wash. 2d 783, 557 P.2d 1 (1976). See also United States
v. Perlman, 430 F.2d 22, 25 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 832 (1970); United States v.
Young, 426 F.2d 93, 94-95 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 828 (1970).
70. Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963);
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); United States v. Polisi, 416 F.2d 573, 577 (2d Cir.
1969); In re Ferguson, 5 Cal. 3d 525, 487 P.2d 1234, 96 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1971); People v.
Wilson, 24 Ill. 2d 425, 182 N.E.2d 203 (1962) (federal government sent informer out of
state; Illinois answerable); Note, The Prosecutor's Duty to Reveal Evidence to the
Defendant, 74 YALE L.J. 136 (1964); Annot., 34 A.L.R.3d 16 (1970).
71. 87 Wash. 2d 783, 557 P.2d 1 (1976).
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found was destroyed. There was no suggestion that the destruc-
tion was for the purpose of hindering the defense.72 It was reasona-
bly probable, however, the evidence was material and there was
no showing that administrative convenience or inadequate facili-
ties justified the failure to preserve the evidence. The remedy?
"[T]he destruction of evidence deprived defendant of a fair trial.
Obviously, for the same reason, it will never be possible for defen-
dant to have a fair trial.""3 Thus, the judgment of conviction was
reversed and the prosecution dismissed.7 Obviously, neither the
police nor the prosecution may decide ex parte what evidence is
"favorable" or "material. '75 The range of sanctions in criminal
destruction of evidence cases will necessarily be developed over
time.7 But for Washington State a prospective rule is announced:
before "testing or disposition of evidence occurs, the defendant
should be given notice of the type of evidence involved and its
planned disposition."7 If defendant cannot be contacted, the aid
of the proper court must be sought.7" A corollary rule is that an
informer's disappearance must be shown not to be the result of
governmental action and that reasonable efforts must be made to
produce the informer."
72. Motive is immaterial. Jackson v. Wainwright, 390 F.2d 288, 295 (5th Cir. 1968);
United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563, 571 (2d Cir. 1961); State v.
Haynes, 16 Wash. App. 778, 559 P.2d 583 (1977). The due process requirement is "not
punishment of society for misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trail to the
accused." Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). But see People v. Poole, 555 P.2d
980 (Colo. 1976).
73. State v. Wright, 87 Wash. 2d 783, 795, 557 P.2d 1, 9 (1976) (Wright, J., concur-
ring).
74. Accord, Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83, 87 (1963); United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971); People v. Hitch, 12
Cal. 3d 641, 527 P.2d 361, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1974).
75. Barbee v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842, 845 (4th Cir. 1964); Griffin v. United States, 183
F.2d 990, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
76. See Comment, Judicial Response to Governmental Loss or Destruction of
Evidence, 39 U. Cm. L. RPv. 542, 564-65 (1972). United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642
(D.C. Cir. 1971), suggests a weighing of "the degree of negligence or bad faith involved,
the importance of the evidence lost, and the evidence of guilt adduced at trial in order to
come to a determination that will serve the ends of justice." Id. at 653. This is perhaps
not as satisfactory as a black and white "destruction requires dismissal" test. Yet it may
be impossible to preserve every fragment of possible evidence. See Note, The Right to
Independent Testing: A New Hitch in the Preservation of Evidence Doctrine, 75 CoLUM.
L. REv. 1355, 1375-80 (1975).
77. State v. Wright, 87 Wash. 2d 783, 793, 557 P.2d 1, 7 (1976).
78. Id.
79. E.g., United States v. Cansler, 419 F.2d 952, 954 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 1029 (1970); Velarde v. United States, 354 F.2d 9 (9th Cir. 1965).
Spoliation
EFFECT OF VARIOUS RELATIONSHIPS
The questions always must arise, who should have called the
particular knowledgeable witness? Which way does the adverse
inference run? The most significant datum in answering these
questions is the relationship of the putative witness to the parties
in the lawsuit. Ordinarily one would expect parties to call those
knowledgeable witnesses who are bound to them by ties of blood,
interest, and affection, unless they happen to be aware that such
persons would, under the suasive impact of the courtroom atmos-
phere and the sanction of the oath, give unfavorable testimony
because of knowledge of facts adverse to the claims of the natural
sponsor. Failure of the natural sponsor to call may, of course, be
due to an unrevealed antipathy, or a party's desire to avoid
sponsorship in order to impeach or cross-examine the putative
witness, but this is always subject to explanation. 0
The strength of the inference naturally wanes in proportion
to the remoteness of the ties. Hence, the inference is strong and
freedom allowed by courts substantial, when the putative witness
is a near relative, but weaker and more restrained when distant
relations are in question. Similarly, the failure to call a knowl-
edgeable current employee gives rise to a strong and vigorous
inference, but neglect to call a knowledgeable disgruntled former
employee will certainly give rise to a much weaker inference, and
the inference may indeed be explained away altogether by the
fact of current non-employment, even without proof of disgruntle-
ment. When it comes to professional relationships, courts are
reluctant to permit the drawing of an inference due sometimes to
the privileged relationship, and in any case to underlying public
policies and ethical considerations.
Employment Relations
An employe is obviously peculiarly available as a witness to
the employer-party and unavailable to the opponent.8' Thus, a
80. Explanation itself may, of course, be embarrassing. See Wall St. J. Sept. 14, 1977,
at 22 col. 1. A Senate committee was about to ratify the appointment of Bert Lance to
manage the nation's budget. Mr. Robert Bloom, former acting Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, failed to forward the information that bank examiners found Mr. Lance to be a
"very weak administrator and executive officer" in running a local Georgia bank. His
explanation: "I happen to be a man who depends on his government job for a living, and
it was only human on my part to worry about the effect on my future." Id.
81. E.g., Tradesmen's Bank v. Mulligan, 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 672, 205 A.2d 186 (1964);
Memphis Light Co. v. Evans, 54 Tenn. App. 223, 389 S.W.2d 80 (1964); Shelby Mutual
Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 53 Tenn. App. 428, 383 S.W.2d 791 (1964) (adverse inference when
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railroad employee sues the railroad for injuries sustained while in
its employ. If defendant neglects to call a co-worker present at the
time of the injury, this failure is held subject to comment by
plaintiff's counsel."'
The law is well settled where an employe who could give
important testimony relative to issues in litigation is not pres-
ent, and his absence is unaccounted for by his employer, who is
a party to the action, the presumption 3 arises that the testi-
mony of such employe would be unfavorable to his employer.84
Under some circumstances, of course, no adverse inference
can be drawn from the failure on the part of the employer to call
the employee. 85 For example, it may be considered that the puta-
tive witness may actually have been equally available to both
sides. 6 Alternatively it may be shown that the witness is unavail-
able or has no knowledge,87 or that the opposing party has not
satisfied his burden of going forward with some evidence, as a
result of which the employer has no duty to do anything.8 Finally,
theei -.... .... 1 ,, that the , mnlov ees testimony
tnere is always 1-1l possib.id..
would be merely cumulative. 9
For some reason the use of adverse inferences from nonprod-
uction of employees in admiralty cases seems very frequent. An
early example in the United States Supreme Court dates to
insurance company failed to call knowledgeable agent); Hope Acres, Inc. v. Harris, 27 Wis.
2d 285, 134 N.W.2d 462, modified, 135 N.W.2d 775 (1965).
82. Western & At. R.R. v. Morrison, 102 Ga. 319, 29 S.E. 104 (1897).
83. Some courts refer to a presumption whereas the majority of the courts refer to an
inference. It wotild appear the use of inference would be preferable. An inference is a
permissible deduction the jury is entitled to draw from the evidence. It has no legal
probative effect other than what the jury is pleased to attribute to it in a given case.
Presumptions of law are artificial rules having legal effect independent of any belief, and
stand in the place of proof until the contrary is proven. Puget Sound Elec. Ry. v. Benson,
253 F. 710 (9th Cir. 1918). A presumption "is a fixed inference." 5 R. MEISENHOLDER,
WASHINGTON EVIDENCE LAw AND PRACTICE § 566 at 533 (1965 ed.).
84. Ellerman v. Skelly Oil Co., 227 Minn. 65, 70, 34 N.W.2d 251, 254 (1948).
85. E.g., International Harvester Co. v. National Surety Co., 44 F.2d 746 (7th Cir.
1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 895 (1931).
86. E.g., Iowa Cent. R.R. v. Hampton Electric Light & Power Co., 204 F. 961 (8th
Cir. 1913); Jordan v. Austin, 161 Ala. 585, 50 So. 70 (1909); Bartlett v. Cain, 366 S.W.2d
491 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963).
87. E.g., Case v. New York Cent. R.R., 329 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1964); Peetz v. St.
Charles St. Ry., 42 La. Ann. 541, 7 So. 688 (1890); Davis v. Castile, 257 S.W. 870 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1924).
88. E.g., Wichita Falls, R. & Ft. W. Ry. v. Emberlin, 255 S.W. 796 (Tex. Civ. App.
1923), rev'd on other grounds, 267 S.W. 463 (Tex. Comm. App. 1924).
89. E.g., Georgia S. & Fla. Ry. v. Perry, 326 F.2d 921 (5th Cir. 1964); Pacific-Atlantic
S.S. Co. v. United States, 175 F.2d 632 (4th Cir. 1949).
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1855.90 More recently, the case of Petition of Mahoney9' involved
a barge owner's petition for limitation of liability in connection
with the sinking of the barge moored at a pier. Upon an issue
whether the barge was seaworthy, certain of petitioner's experts
gave testimony that it was. Defendant failed to call any of its
employees who were working on the barge when it sank. Hence,
the court stated:
It is not without significance the [defendant] failed to call
. . . its employees who worked on the ARLENE. . .. I draw
the inference from [defendant's] failure to call the witnesses
that their testimony as to the condition of the ARLENE would
have been adverse to [defendant's] interest.92
In another recent admiralty case, question arose whether the
Russel 18 had actually struck a bank, causing claimants' hus-
bands' deaths. Nonproduction of owner's witnesses was consid-
ered to give rise to an inference reinforcing the testimony of
claimants' expert:
While Marina contests the Russell 18 did not strike the bank,
it failed to call any of its surveyors or experts who examined the
Russell 18. The unexplained failure to call the only witnesses
who were in a position to challenge Ganly's testimony permits
the inference that their testimony would corroborate his. 3
An adverse inference was also drawn in In re Landi's Petition,9"
wherein a cabin cruiser and a tanker collided. The court held:
Of course, as far as the Derby is concerned, the unexplained
failure to call as a witness anyone connected with the navigation
of that vessel may give rise to an unfavorable inference concern-
ing that navigation. Omission to produce a lookout or to account
satisfactorily for not doing so gives rise to an inference that a
proper lookout was not kept. 5
90. Culbertson v. The Southern Belle, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 584, 588 (1855).
91. 255 F. Supp. 310 (D.N.H. 1966).
92. Id. at 312. The inference is also available against the United States in admiralty
litigation. Bloomfield S.S. Co. v. United States, 258 F. Supp. 891 (S.D. Tex. 1964), rev'd
on other grounds, 359 F.2d 506 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1004 (1966).
93. Petition of Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 248 F. Supp. 15, 22 n.6
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) (Weinfield, J.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1966). See also Cargo of the
Brig Aurora, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 387 (1813); J. Gerber & Co. v. S.S. Sabine Howaldt,
437 F.2d 580, 593 (2d Cir. 1971); O.F. Schearer & Sons v. Cincinnati Marine Serv., Inc.,
279 F.2d 68, 73 (6th Cir. 1960); Coyle Lines, Inc. v. United States, 195 F.2d 737 (5th Cir.
1952); Old Colony Ins. Co. v. S.S. Southern Star, 280 F. Supp. 189, 191 (D. Ore. 1967);
Petition of Mahoney, 255 F. Supp. 310 (D.N.H. 1966).
94. 194 F. Supp. 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). See also The New York, 175 U.S. 187, 204-05
(1899).
95. In re Landi's Petition, 194 F. Supp. 353, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). See also The Joseph
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Again, however, the inference is not available if good reason for
the nonproduction is given to the court."
Probably the most frequent situation in which failure of an
employer to call employees has given rise to the inference is in the
case of railroad accidents. 7 Even in this context, however, there
are cases where the drawing of the inference has been disap-
proved."' Adverse inferences are also available from the failure of
a corporation to call its officers or directors, as the United States
Supreme Court has observed:
The failure under the circumstances to call as witnesses
those officers who did have authority to act for the distributors
and who were in a position to know whether they had acted in
pursuance of agreement is itself persuasive that their testimony,
if given, would have been unfavorable to appellants. The pro-
duction of weak evidence when strong is available can lead only
to the conclusion that the strong would have been adverse."
Nor is the sovereign exempt; it has been held that failure by
the United States to produce knowledgeable employees "not only
justifies but compels the inference that such testimony would
have been unfavorable to the government." 1" So also the failure
of any other principal to call his agent. 10 Once the relationship
ends, of course, the inference becomes unavailable; at least, ab-
sent special circumstances, so holds the increasing weight of au-
thority:
This rule, however, has no application where such a witness
is no longer in the employ of the party to the litigation. When
the evidence discloses such to be the fact and the burden of
proof is on the plaintiff, no obligation rests upon a defendant
employer to present his former employee as a witness. Here,
plaintiff did not produce the witness nor explain his absence.
B. Thomas, 81 F. 578, 583-84 (N.D. Cal. 1897), aff'd, 86 F. 658 (9th Cir. 1898); The
Bombay, 46 F. 665, 667 (E.D.N.Y. 1891).
96. E.g., Hoskyn & Co. v. Silver Line Ltd., 63 F. Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd,
143 F.2d 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 767 (1944); Fetan v. Atlantic & Caribbean
Steam Nav. Co., 60 F.2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1932); Boston Ins. Co. v. Mesick & Mesick, 286
F. 531 (D. Conn. 1923). See also United States v. S.S. Soya Atlantic, 213 F. Supp. 7, 26
(D. Md. 1963) (alteration of evidence).
97. Annot., 5 A.L.R.2d 893, 903 (1949).
98. E.g., Louisville & N.R.R. v. Sullivan Timber Co., 126 Ala. 95, 27 So. 760 (1900);
Norfolk & W.R.R. v. Brown, 91 Va. 668, 22 S.E. 496 (1895).
99. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226 (1939). See also Mari-
gold Coal, Inc. v. Thames, 274 Ala. 421, 427, 149 So. 2d 276, 281-82 (1963) (comment upon
absence at trial of defendant's president).
100. Bloomfield S.S. Co. v. United States, 258 F. Supp. 891, 908 (S.D. Tex. 1964).
101. Annot., 5 A.L.R.2d 893, 909-11 (1949).
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Her failure in this respect certainly would not be said to have
created a presumption that the testimony of the absent witness
would have been unfavorable to the Skelly Company.'
Physicians
When a physical or mental condition of a party is in issue, it
would be natural to assume that the party's personal physician
would have the best knowledge, and, moreover, would be inclined
favorably to his patient. It is, therefore, natural to suppose when
such a party fails to call his personal physician, that he would
have testified unfavorably to such party's interests. On the other
hand, in states where the physician-patient privilege exists, it
might be argued that utilization of the inference, allowing com-
ment upon the nonproduction, etc., would effectively negate the
privilege.10 3
In a notable Mississippi case,' 4 plaintiff called as witnesses
two of the three physicians who had examined him, but failed to
call the third. The court upheld a jury instruction authorizing an
inference that the unelicited testimony would have been unfavor-
able. A physician-patient privilege statute was in effect at the
time, but the court reasoned that the legislature never intended
to condone such "unjust uses." Although no comment was al-
lowed in Mississippi upon failure to call an attorney or a spouse
when a privilege applied, the court considered that "our juris-
prudence attained to its present heights and our civil society
reached its flower in a hundred years of development in this state
before the physicians' privilege statute ever became part of our
law."' 05 Further:
[Ilt is the duty of courts, as time progresses, to closely observe
the uses to which any procedural rule, whether of the common
law or of the statutes, has been put, and to so control those uses,
that while the terms of the rule or statute shall be fairly fulfilled,
it shall be put to no use for the ends of injustice, or to the defeat
of real justice, when such use can at least be minimized by resort
to other established procedural rules, and when such resort
102. Ellerman v. Skelly Oil Co., 227 Minn. 65, 70, 34 N.W.2d 251, 254 (1948).
103. See, e.g., Patania v. Silverstone, 3 Ariz. App. 424, 428, 415 P.2d 139, 143 (1966).
Of course, courts often hold that if the patient places privileged matters in issue, the
privilege does not apply. See, e.g., Collins v. Bair, 256 Ind. 230, 268 N.E.2d 95 (1971);
Killings v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 187 Miss. 265, 192 So. 577 (1940). But see Bond v.
Independent Order of Foresters, 69 Wash. 2d 879, 421 P.2d 351 (1967).
104. Killings v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 187 Miss. 265, 192 So. 577 (1940).
105. Id. at 273, 192 So. at 579.
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works no intrusion upon that which is essentially fundamental
in the judicial process or in the preservation of the foundations
of society itself.'"1
Similarly, in a significant federal case, 07 plaintiff neglected to
call the physician who had attended her deceased husband and
the court said this failure justified the inference that the physi-
cian would not have affirmed her contention that her husband's
death was the result of an accident. The courts are badly split,
however, some courts allowing the inference, 08 and some not.'"1
When, under modem court rules, " ' a physician has examined
one of the parties at the request of the other, the inference should
be freely available against the employing party, no privilege
seemingly applying in such circumstances."' No inference should
be available, however, when the physician is appointed by the
court, because the appointed physician is equally available to
both parties. Nevertheless, in one especially interesting case,"2
upon defendant's motion, the court appointed two physicians to
examine plaintiff. Although at trial, defendant produced only one
of them, without explaining the failure to call the other, the court
held that an adverse inference could be drawn.
Attorneys
Understandably, courts are exceedingly reluctant to permit
an adverse inference to be drawn upon failure of a party to call
an attorney to testify, especially when the supposedly knowledge-
106. Id.
107. Troutman v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 125 F.2d 769, 773 (6th Cir. 1942).
108. E.g., Taylor v. Associated Cab Co., 110 Ga. App. 616, 139 S.E.2d 519 (1964);
Richoux v. Grain Dealers Ins. Co., 175 So. 2d 883 (La. Ct. App. 1965); Thomas v. Mary-
land Cas. Co., 32 So. 2d 472 (La. Ct. App. 1947); Vergin v. City of Saginaw, 196 Mich.
499, 84 N.W. 1075 (1917); Cooley v. Foltz, 85 Mich. 47, 48 N.W. 176 (1891); Killings v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 187 Miss. 265, 192 So. 577 (1940); Gatlin v. Allen, 203 Miss.
135, 33 So. 2d 304 (1948); Robinson v. Haydel, 177 Miss. 233, 171 So. 7 (1936); Miller v.
Collins, 328 Mo. 313, 40 S.W.2d 1062 (1931); Atkinson v. United Rys., 286 Mo. 634, 228
S.W. 483 (1921); Evans v. Trenton, 112 Mo. 390, 20 S.W. 614 (1892).
109. E.g., Stone v. Stone, 136 F.2d 761, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Cherry-Burrell Co. v.
Thatcher, 107 F.2d 65, 69 (9th Cir. 1939); Dorian v. Federal Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.,
25 N.J. Misc. 249, 264, 52 A.2d 551, 559 (1947), rev'd on other grounds, 136 N.J.L. 306,
55 A.2d 776 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1947), aff'd, 137 N.J.L. 185, 59 A.2d 9 (1948). Cf. Crawford v.
McNece, 388 S.W.2d 809, 816 (Mo. 1965) (semble; failure to call physician not ground for
adverse inference but only affected credibility of plaintiff's evidence).
110. E.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 35.
111. See, e.g., 5 R. MEISENHOLDER, WASHINGTON EVIDENCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 225 at
208 (1965 ed.); 2A W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §§ 821-25
(1961 ed.).
112. Commonwealth Power & Light Co. v. Vaught, 191 Ky. 641, 231 S.W. 247 (1921).
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able attorney is counsel of record. "The relation between attorney
and client and its privileges are such that courts could not func-
tion nor justice be administered in any acceptable way other than
that the privilege be placed wholly above any adverse comment
or inference from it ... 113 Such inferences have, however, on
occasion been drawn. Thus, in a stunning case,"' defendant's
former attorney testified that he was no longer representing de-
fendant at the time a certain notice was allegedly served upon
him, and that he so informed plaintiff's attorney. Plaintiff's at-
torney did not take the witness stand to refute this testimony,
and the court drew the inference that the former attorney's testi-
mony was true."' Similarly, the Supreme Court of Washington
held that defendant's execution of a deed to plaintiff in the pres-
ence of the attorneys was sufficiently established by the testi-
mony of defendant's attorney accompanied by the failure of
plaintiff to call her attorney. Her unexplained failure fostered the
inference that "if his testimony would have been favorable..
she would have called him."'1
Ethical considerations may justify nonallowance of an infer-
ence. In an Illinois case," 7 the drafter of a will was also attorney
for the executor. The court held no inference could be drawn from
the attorney's failure to testify, because it would be a breach of
professional propriety for him to do so. There appears to be no
case expressly stating that an adverse inference can be drawn
notwithstanding the privilege; the cases discussed above, how-
ever, indicate that common sense occasionally overbalances doc-
trine.
Family Relationships
Manifestly, the closer the relationship, the stronger will be
the inference from nonproduction of the related witness. Thus,
cases are frequent in which a negative inference has been drawn
from failure to call a spouse,"' especially when no marital privi-
113. Killings v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 187 Miss. 265, 273, 192 So. 577, 579 (1940)
(dictum). As to the husband-wife privilege, moreover, "the relationship of husband and
wife lies at the very foundations of civil society .... " Id.
114. Chamberlain v. Bruce Furniture Co., 35 So. 2d 257 (La. Ct. App. 1948).
115. See also United States v. Woodall, 438 F.2d 1317, 1327 (5th Cir. 1971); Van
Houten v. Whitaker, 169 Cal. App. 2d 510, 337 P.2d 900 (1959); Douglas v. Insurance Co.
of N. America, 215 Mich. 529, 184 N.W. 539 (1921).
116. Gardner v. Herbert, 165 Wash. 429, 432, 5 P.2d 782, 783 (1931).
117. Ravenscroft v. Stull, 280 Ill. 406, 117 N.E. 602 (1917). See also Gardner v.
Benedict, 82 N.Y. Sup. Ct. (75 Hun.) 204, 207-08, 27 N.Y.S. 3, 5 (1894).
118. E.g., Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Thomason, 293 Ky. 142, 168 S.W.2d 547
(1943); Jones v. Wettlin, 39 Wyo. 331, 271 P. 217 (1928).
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lege obtrudes."91 There are, however, cases to the contrary.'20
There exist, in fact, criminal cases, in which adverse inferences
have been drawn against defendant for failing to call his spouse.'2 '
In an Oklahoma case,'22 defendant husband was prosecuted for
selling intoxicating liquor; certain state witnesses testified that
the sale was made by accused's wife. The court made this extraor-
dinary, but telling, analysis:
If the sales were not made by the wife of appellant as testi-
fied to on behalf of the state, she was a competent witness in
his behalf. His failure to place her upon the stand, or to ac-
count for his failure to do so, was a tacit admission of the truth-
fulness of the state's testimony. Like Adam of old, his only
defense was that the woman did it. This plea did not save
Adam, and it should not be permitted to save appellant. In such
a case as this, the husband should not be allowed to hide behind
his wife's skirts. '"
This writer, however, has not yet discovered a case permitting an
adverse inference in the face of a timely-invoked and applicable
statutory or other spousal privilege or immunity.
Frequently, inferences are drawn from failure to call knowl-
edgeable parents of parties in both criminal and civil cases.2
Similarly, if a knowledgeable child is omitted from the witness
stand, at least if the child appears competent to testify.'2 5 Similar
119. If an existing marital privilege renders one spouse incompetent to testify against
the other, no negative inference from nonproduction of the spouse is permissible. See
United States v. Tapia-Lopez, 521 F.2d 582, 584 (9th Cir. 1975).
120. E.g., McGeorge v. Grand Realty Trust, 316 Mass. 373, 55 N.E.2d 694 (1944);
McPhail v. Houghtelling, 225 S.W.2d 162 (Mo. Ct. App. 1949); Clover v. Clover, 224 S.W.
916 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
121. See, e.g., United States v. Seay, 432 F.2d 395, 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 942 (1970); Tucker v. State, 7 Okla. Crim. 634, 125 P. 1089 (1912); Wood v. State,
374 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964). But see State v. Wyatt, 276 S.W.2d 86,89-90 (Mo
1955).
122. Tucker v. State, 7 Okla. Crim. 634, 125 P. 1089 (1912).
123. Id. at 644, 125 P. at 1093.
124. Civil cases: E.g., Young v. Corrigan, 208 F. 431, 435-36 (N.D. Ohio 1912); Farmer
v. Smith, 227 Ark. 582, 300 S.W.2d 937 (1957); Duchossois v. Duchossois, 139 Pa. Super.
Ct. 1, 5, 10 A.2d 824, 826 (1940).
Criminal cases: E.g., People v. Rosoto, 58 Cal. 2d 304, 357-58, 373 P.2d 867, 896, 23
Cal. Rptr. 779, 808 (1962), modified, 62 Cal. 2d 684, 401 P.2d 220, 43 Cal. Rptr. 828 (1965);
Anderson v. Commonwealth, 288 Ky. 576, 578, 156 S.W.2d 860, 861 (1941); State v.
Martin, 32 N.M. 48, 65-67, 250 P. 842, 849-50 (1926).
125. Civil cases: E.g., Lasseter v. Green, 202 Ga. 148, 148-49, 42 S.E.2d 480, 480-81
(1947); Chicago Daily News, Inc. v. Kohler, 360 Ill. 351, 369-70, 196 N.E. 445, 453-54
(1935); Van Bernum v. Van Bernum, 140 N.J. Eq. 413, 415-16, 55 A.2d 51, 52 (1947). But
see Jenkins v. Bierschenk, 333 F.2d 421, 425 (8th Cir. 1964) (son equally available to both
parties). Cf. Veillon v. Sylvester, 174 So. 2d 189 (La. Ct. App. 1965) (son not in position
to see).
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inferences have been drawn from the failure to call siblings,' 26
nephews,'27 and parents-in-law.1'2
Other Relationships and Subject Omissions
Courts have allowed the drawing of adverse inferences in
other situations; for example, the failure of property owners to
call their predecessors in title,12' or a party's failure to call fellow
passengers, 4 partners,' or bankers. 32 It has, however, been held
that the failure of an accused to call a co-defendant or accomplice
does not justify any adverse inference against accused. 33 With
respect to any of the above relationships, what if the witness is
called, but the interrogation is carefully limited to skirt signifi-
cant areas? In such a situation it is widely held that an inference
adverse to the sponsor of the witness is available.' u As in total
failure to produce, of course, the measure of the relationship will
determine the strength of the inference.
INSTRUCTIONS
The rules governing application of adverse inferences when
the putative witness is or is not subject to the control of the party
against whom the adverse inference is sought to be drawn, or
where the witness is equally available to both parties, are easily
enough stated. But their application in specific cases has proved
a challenging task. A good borderline case is Reehil v. Fraas, '1 in
Criminal cases: E.g., Commonwealth v. Clark, 80 Mass. (14 Gray) 373 (1860); State
v. Parker, 172 Mo. 191, 204-05, 72 S.W. 650, 654 (1903).
126. E.g., United States Bond & Mort. Co. v. Reddick, 199 Ark. 82, 133 S.W.2d 23
(1939); Henderson v. Ball, 193 Iowa 812, 186 N.W. 668 (1922).
127. E.g., In re Eisenberg, 41 F. Supp. 482, 484 (E.D. Pa. 1941) (Kalodner, J.).
128. E.g., Button v. Knight, 95 Vt. 381, 115 A. 499 (1921). However, no inference is
available when the putative witness is related to both parties. E.g., Knoots v. Sentinel
Life Ins. Co., 228 Mo. App. 353, 67 S.W.2d 798 (1934).
129. E.g., Dawson v. Davis, 125 Conn. 330, 334, 5 A.2d 703, 705 (1939).
130. E.g., A.B.C. Storage & Moving Co., Inc. v. Herron, 138 S.W.2d 211, 215-16 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1940) (dictum). But see Rosenstrom v. North Bend Stage Lines, 154 Wash. 57,
65, 280 P. 932, 935 (1929) (inference unavailable in case of "strangers who are mere
witnesses to the transaction and equally within the call of one party as the other").
131. See, e.g., Bleecker v. Johnston, 69 N.Y. 309, 311 (1877) (dictum).
132. Green v. Enen, 270 S.W. 929, 931 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
133. E.g., Clayton v. United States, 152 F.2d 402 (9th Cir. 1945); State v. Cavness,
46 Haw. 470, 381 P.2d 685 (1963). See also Bradley v. United States, 420 F.2d 181 (D.C.
Cir. 1969).
134. See, e.g., Halpine v. Halpine, 138 Conn. 578, 87 A.2d 148 (1952); Milliman v.
Rochester Ry., 3 App. Div. 109, 39 N.Y.S. 274 (1896).
135. 129 App. Div. 563, 114 N.Y.S. 17 (1908), rev'd on other grounds, 197 N.Y. 64,
90 N.E. 340 (1909).
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which defendant's horse and wagon knocked down plaintiff pe-
destrian. At the time of the collision a boy, a stranger to defen-
dant, with no right to be in the wagon, was nevertheless riding in
it with the driver. This boy gave testimony on the first trial of the
action but on retrial was not called by either party. The trial
judge permitted plaintiff's counsel in summing up to refer to
defendant's failure to call the boy and overruled objections to
these comments. In his charge the judge told the jurors that,
although no unfavorable inference could be drawn against defen-
dant for not calling the boy, "I leave it all to you as one of the
questions of fact in this action."
The Appellate Division reversed by a vote of 3-2. The ma-
jority considered that it was not always for the jury to draw any
inference it saw fit from the failure to call any witness. There is
a line somewhere, and the court, without stating exactly why,
held the case before it was on the wrong side of the line. The
dissent sharply differed from this view and avowed it was for the
jury to say what inference, if any, should be drawn. As the dis-
senting judges pointed out, the trial judge had very carefully
charged the jury:'36
This witness was not under the control of the defendant.
This witness sat right here in the courtroom. He could have been
called by either party. So far as it appears, he was not employed
by the defendant. He was not in the control of the defendant,
and, therefore, under those circumstances, gentlemen, I do not
think you can draw any inferences against the defendant from
the fact that he did not call that witness, any more than you can
draw an inference against the plaintiff from the fact that he did
not call that witness. It is only in cases where the evidence is
peculiarly in the power of one of the parties that such an infer-
ence as that will be permitted. In my opinion, no inference can
be drawn either way from the fact that the witness was not
called. In my opinion, he was not called because neither party
was satisfied with his evidence. I leave that all to you as one of
the questions of fact in this action.
This is approximately the position of the Washington Su-
preme Court Committee on Jury Instructions, "7 which concludes
the inference "may" be drawn only when a failure to produce
"unexplained, creates a suspicion that the failure to produce was
a willful attempt to withhold competent testimony." The Com-
mittee concluded: "There are so many collateral reasons why a
136. 129 App. Div. 563, 571, 114 N.Y.S.17, 23 (1908).
137. WASMNGTON PATERN JURY INSTRUCTONS-C VL, §§ 5.00, 5.01 (1967).
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party may not wish to call a particular witness that the Commit-
tee believes the matter is better left to argument of counsel.
138
In this writer's opinion, an instruction, if one must be given,
should read about as follows:
The failure to call any given witness in and of itself does not
constitute evidence, because it is not proof of any fact. No duty
rests upon a party to call any given witness within his control
who could testify to facts material to the issues in this case, nor
does any presumption attach to an omission to call such a wit-
ness. Where it is apparently within the power of a party to
produce a witness, and it appears that the testimony of that
witness would throw additional light upon the controversy, the
jury is not permitted to speculate as to what the testimony of
the uncalled witness would be. The unexplained omission by
one party, however, to call such a witness who is within his
control warrants you in considering most strongly and favorably
the evidence presented by the other, or opposing party, which
the testimony of the witness not produced might have contra-
dicted or explained, if under all of the circumstances of this case
you deem such a course to be justified. 39
Where any jury inference is warranted from failure of a party
to call a witness, and if the jury is to be instructed at all, they
should be instructed that they may infer the witness would not
have controverted the opposing party's material adverse testi-
mony that the witness was in a position to corroborate or controv-
ert, because the party might reasonably have been expected to
call the uncalled witness if his testimony would have been favora-
ble to the party. Or, they might be instructed that the uncalled
witness would not have corroborated material testimony of the
party who ordinarily would have called him and that he was in a
position to corroborate or controvert. The jury, therefore, would
be warranted to lend credence to the testimony adverse to the
party who thus might have controverted it if he could, and might
138. Id. § 5.01 (comment) at 33-34. As to the Washington situation in general, see,
e.g., State v. Nelson, 63 Wash. 2d 188, 386 P.2d 142 (1963); State v. Baker, 56 Wash. 2d
846, 355 P.2d 806 (1960); Wright v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 7 Wash. 2d 341, 109 P.2d 542
(1941). As to the breadth of permissible comment, see, e.g., Krieger v. McLaughlin, 50
Wash. 2d 461, 313 P.2d 361 (1957). But see McCormick, What Shall the Trial Judge Tell
the Jury About Presumptions?, 13 WASH. L. REv. 185 (1938). Instructing juries about
presumptions is "well-nigh universal." In criminal cases, this is "especially true of...
'hortatory' presumptions, such as . . . the presumption against one who suppresses evi-
dence, that it would have made against him." Id. at 187.
139. See generally Hofstadter & Richter, Effect of Failure to Call a Witness-New
Rule Proposed, 135 N.Y.L.J., June 4, 1956, at 4, cols. 1-3; id., June 5, 1956, at 4, cols. 1-
3; id. June 6, 1956, at 4, cols. 1-3; id. June 7, 1956, at 4, cols. 1-3.
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weigh such testimony most strongly against such party. But there
is no presumption involved, and the jury have no right to indulge
in speculation regarding what the witness, if called, would have
testified to. That is, the case must be decided on the substantive
evidence before the tribunal.
The trier of facts, engaged in the subtle task of deciding
disputed facts, should not be subject to a mechanical rule that
every experienced trial lawyer and trial judge knows is honored
more in the breach than in the observance by the bench without
aid of jury. Mr. Justice Miller once observed how readily judges
came to an agreement upon questions of law and how often they
disagreed upon questions of fact. Accordingly, juries should not
have to wrestle with a charge that impedes and .obscures rather
than assists and lights their way to a sound solution.
The basis for all spoliation rules is, or ought to be, common
sense. It is an obvious truth that self-interest ordinarily prompts
a litigant to produce all available evidence likely to help him. If
he does not call a witness with pertinent knowledge who is subject
to his "control," there must be a good reason for not doing so.
This is an inference, clearly. From its nature, the inference can
be as varied as the myriad of circumstances in which it is called
into play. It fits into a prescribed formula no better than the
circumstances that gave it birth. Thus, one supposes that the jury
should be instructed, roughly, to follow its common sense in the
matter, the natural supposition being that unproduced evidence
would work against the nonproducer.
NATURE OF SPOLIATION
The application of the law is not a purely mechanical pro-
cess; it involves not merely logic but intuition as well. The naive
notion that the law should be applied merely mechanically is
attractive, but English law is not a science. A peculiarity of spo-
liation evidence is that it tends not to be objective, of the world
of nature, but subjective, part of the domain of human intuition.
It usually operates, not directly to establish a relevant datum, but
indirectly, by way of reducing the probative force of evidence
actually produced by the spoliator. It thus adds, but only indi-
rectly, to the relative weight and probative force of the case af-
firmatively offered by the spoliator's opponent. It impeaches the
spoliator and rehabilitates-or, better, accredits-his opponent.
Spoliation proof is thus halfway between impeaching, nonsub-
stantive evidence on the one hand, and direct, affirmative, sub-
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stantive proof on the other."0
As to the impeaching quality of spoliation, when two part-
ners jointly sue, and only one testifies, because the other partner
did not corroborate the one who did give evidence, it is for the
trier to consider that fact. If the trier concludes the unproduced,
knowledgeable partner did not testify because he could not, or
dare not, the judge or jury will assess the testifying partner's
testimony accordingly, and decide from this circumstance,
among others, the weight to be given his testimony, or whether
they should believe it at all. The same is true-though generally
to a lesser extent-of the testimony of a nonparty witness.
LIMITs OF THE DOCTRINE
Great care, one supposes, ought to be taken, not to give to
spoliation a weight it does not merit. It is perhaps true that na-
tions vary, and generations change, in the quantity and in the
tone of moral conduct, in the good character and purity of feeling
that are diffused through a society, and in their reverence or
irreverence for the sacred quality of the oath. Bentham tells us
that in another age there existed "houses of call. . . for a sort of
witness of all work," and that even in his own time, under the
Turkish regime, "it seems generally understood that the trade of
testimony exists upon a footing at least as flourishing as any other
.... ."" Men differ in force of character and in courage. Courts
diverge in the breadth of their abilities (or incompetencies) as
well as in the hardihood (or "squishy softness") of their impartial-
ity, not to mention the quantity of evidence they may require to
be exacted for the proof of an essential fact.
Undoubtedly, the suppression or fabrication of evidence or
the failure to produce significant available evidence will always
be a singularly forceful circumstance bearing upon the proof of a
fact. Yet instances surely have occurred of innocent persons,
alarmed at a body of evidence perhaps collusively constructed
against them, and which, while false or inconclusive, they felt
themselves unable to refute, having recourse to the fabrication of
exculpatory testimony. Jeremy Bentham relates the following
interesting story. A great personage produced a sumptuous enter-
140. Compare Wright v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 7 Wash. 2d 341, 353-55, 109 P.2d 542,
547-48 (1941) (Blake, J., dissenting) (rebuttable presumption) with Stocker v. Boston &
M.R.R., 84 N.H. 377, 151 A. 457 (1930) (inference not substantive proof). The insistence
is that the trier of fact base his finding on the evidence before him and not speculate on
what unproduced evidence might show.
141. 3 J. BENTHAm, RATiONALE OF JUnICIAL EvmNcE, 168, 169 (1827).
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tainment for a numerous and mixed company, at which a valua-
ble jewel, belonging to a member of the company, was suddenly
missed. The alarm having been given, upon the proposal of a
member of the party, all present agreed to be searched, save one
man who, by virtue of his obstinate refusal, drew down upon
himself the strong suspicion of the balance of the company. Yet
this man entreated and secured from the master of the house a
private audience; whereupon, his pockets being turned inside out,
there was discovered, not the bauble sought, but six drumsticks,
which he had laid by to carry home to his wife, who was starv-
ing.14 2
Sir Edward Coke relates a stunning instance of the same sort,
of an innocent person, alarmed at the mass of evidence mar-
shalled against him, having recourse to suppression or fabrication
of evidence. 43 An uncle had the guardianship of his niece, who
was entitled under her father's will, to a substantial estate, upon
attaining the age of 16. The uncle was next in line in this estate.
When she was about 8, the uncle was heard one day correcting
her on account of some offense, when she said, "Oh, uncle, ill
me not." Thereafter, the child disappeared, and the uncle was
jailed on suspicion of her murder. The uncle, released to produce
the child, could not do so, but dressed up another child to repre-
sent the niece. The falsehood being detected, the uncle was con-
victed and executed for the supposed murder. It afterwards ap-
peared, however, that the niece had only run away, and remained
away until she attained the age sixteen, whereupon she returned
to claim her property. "Which case," Lord Coke adds, "we have
reported for a double caveat: first to judges, that they in case of
life judge not too hastily upon bare presumption; and secondly,
to the innocent and true man, that he never seek to excuse him-
self by false or undue means, lest thereby he offending God (the
Author of Truth) overthrow himself, as the uncle did."''
The unexplained absence of material witnesses is common-
place in trial practice. But the question of how the law should
deal with such an everyday occurrence has been highly confused,
in the courts, in the books, and in the classroom. Perhaps too
much erudition has been expended on the subject so the plain
truth comes to be overlooked; the difficulty is one of giving practi-
cal expression in the formulation of the rule to the teachings of
everyday experience and the age long experience of mankind.
142. Based upon a story related in id. at 88-89.




Counsel, it is submitted, should be permitted to comment as fully
as their hearts desire and the trier should be permitted to draw
whatever inference is considered justified. There is authority for
this position. As Judge Miller observed, dissenting in Reehil v.
Fraas:45
The question in a given case is: What, according to common
experience, would a party be likely to do? That question cannot
be defined by a line: the jury must be permitted to determine
whether any inference at all shall be drawn from a given state
of facts, its strength, if one is drawn, and the effect to be given
it in considering the other evidence in the case.
This may seem a radical, simplistic, proposal. It would, of
course, render obsolete much that has been written on the sub-
ject. It is submitted, however, as sound, easy, workable, and
above all realistic. In jury trials it would relieve the judge of the
almost impossible task of determining first whether any comment
or instruction at all is called for, then correctly stating an amor-
phous rule; confusion would give way to directness and simplicity
and the trier would be relieved of an assumed constraint to con-
form to artificial rules.
CONCLUSION
Jurors are told they are to appraise veracity as they would
in their own affairs. They are expected to do their own thinking
in their own way, and their very freedom to do so is a salient
feature of the jury system. Similarly in the case of a bench trial,
findings are made against a backdrop of the judge's own experi-
ence. Nonproduction of evidence by a party is one of the factors,
and a highly significant one, that the trier takes into account in
the quest for the truth. The inference, if any, he will draw, against
either party, depends upon innumerable factors: the nature of the
evidence withheld, the relation of the uncalled witness to the
party, the witnesses' availability and accessibility, and the count-
less other circumstances that bear in varying degree upon the
final question whether, when the nonproduction demands explan-
ation, it has been explained satisfactorily, or whether the party
has failed to offer the evidence because he believed this course
more to his advantage. These factors are to be weighed by the
trier of fact; the inference drawing is merely part of the mental
operation by which he ascertains the truth. Should that mental
operation be circumscribed by legal formula? The trier should be
left free from dictation as to how he is to reach his goal. Water-
145. 129 App. Div. 563, 570, 114 N.Y.S. 17, 22-23 (1908).
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tight compartments are alien to human reason, though perhaps
not to robotry, and harsh canons contribute little to the delicate
process of discovering truth.
The human brain makes visual and other perceptions coher-
ent by virtue of some internal organizing faculty. The colors of a
painting assume their varying shades, depths, textures, and qual-
ities from the surroundings in which they are placed. The mental
process of evaluation of received evidence is similar. The acts and
statements of litigating parties secure their significance and
weight from their total context. The importance of a party's fail-
ure to call a witness differs in each individual case according to
its background. Frequently, the diverse threads of the proofs
bearing upon a matter in issue resemble a hopelessly entangled
Gordian knot until one thread is pulled and a whole series of
variegated and inchoate motives, acts, and events emerges clear
and straight in a cohesive whole. Any rule boldly attempting to
alter reality must prove sterile and affirmatively obstructive.
